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The issue of political transition in Myanmar has generated scholarly interest and debate on the nature and outcomes of the whole process. Various questions have been raised about the on-going National Convention entrusted with the task of drafting a new constitution. Some scholars placed the political transition in the context of national reconciliation in Myanmar while others analyzed it within the conceptual framework of democratization. A recent article by Robert Taylor examined the domestic and international political environment in which the National Convention is being conducted to draft the third constitution for Myanmar. He neatly described the bumpy road that Myanmar had gone through so far and he offered a cautiously optimistic view about the further steps in the process. One might question why only the political executive and not the other aspects of the political system. In Andrew Heywood's words: "Political systems can operate without constitutions, assemblies, judiciaries, even parties, but they cannot survive without an executive branch to formulate government policy and ensure that it is implemented. Such is the potential power of executives that much of political development has taken the form of attempts to check or constrain them, either by forcing them to operate within a constitutional framework, or by making them accountable to a popular assembly or democratic electorate." of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) explained that upon completion of the convention, the remaining task will be carried out phase by phase in line with the seven-point roadmap. The Secretary-1 stated that the State constitution will be drawn on the basis of basic principles and detailed basic principles, and the constitution will be approved after holding the referendum. He continued, "With the emergence of the Constitution the election will be held in accordance with the laws and the State power will be handed over to the civilian government after electing the Hluttaw representatives as well as forming the Hluttaw and the cabinet (italics are mine)". 4 The completion of the National Convention, however, does not necessarily translate into the drafting of a constitution. The National Convention is just the first step in the seven-point roadmap declared on 30 August 2003 by the then Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt. 5 What is not clear in the roadmap is the second step. This step could be considered as a room for political maneuver by the SPDC regime, as "step-by-step implementation of the process necessary for the emergence of the genuine and disciplineflourishing democratic system" does not give any hint at all on what the process entails.
Moreover, even the completion of the drafting of a constitution does not necessarily mean the speedy transfer of power to a constitutional government as it has to go through a national referendum process and general elections. Yet, it is now time to look back at the process of political transition in Myanmar.
THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN 1988
There are several structural causes that led to the fall of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government, the only legal ruling political party since 1963. However, these are beyond the scope of the present paper. However, it is interesting to look at the political These seven points are: (1) Reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996; (2) After the successful holding of the National Convention, step-by-step implementation of the process necessary for the emergence of the genuine and disciplined democratic system; (3) Drafting of a new constitution in accordance with basic principles and detailed basic principles laid down by the national convention; (4) Adoption of the constitution through national referendum; (5) Holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hluttaw (Legislative bodies) according to the new constitution; (6) Convening of Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance with the new constitution; and (7) Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the State's leaders elected by the Hluttaw; and the government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw. student demonstrations, the political situation in Myanmar began to deteriorate. According to this document, it was agreed that the defeat of the opposition movement was absolutely dependent on the continued loyalty of the army or Tatmadaw to the BSPP. At the same time, it was argued, if a multi-party system were introduced it would 'negate the role' of the military and the many Tatmadaw veterans who had given their 'lives and limbs' for the country. Their aims were thus synonymous and a new tactical strategy had to be drawn up 'to crush the opposition'. The first step would be to separate the students from the masses; the second to 'annihilate the student leaders and hardliners.' To do this military personnel would be secretly sent out throughout the country to create conditions of such lawlessness that 'the masses and business community will come to depend on the armed forces for protection'; then as the chaos continued, people would soon realise the 'aimlessness and confusion of a multi-party system.' Sooner or later this would pave the way for a coup, the only question being one of timing. If the country continued its rapid slide into anarchy the military takeover would be quick; if not, efforts would have to be stepped up, Criminal elements would have to be let loose and allowed to go on the rampage. But of the greatest importance in any scenario, the report argued, was that the Tatmadaw be back in charge again during what it was recognised would be a period of transition, which could well mean an interim government or the holding of a referendum or multi-party elections. This would not matter, for once in control the students should already have been isolated from the masses, and, with the photographic evidence it was now gathering, the MIS would be able to pick up all the student leaders, writers and film stars who were leading the democracy movement.
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A slightly different version can be found in Bertil Linter's Outrage in the following term.
The first step would be to spread the rumour that Ne Win had left, or was about to leave, the country. Attempts would be made to drive a wedge between the students and the monks on the one hand and the people on the other. Meanwhile, DDSI agents should "be responsible for creating anarchy and staging covert operation on as large a scale as possible." This would include "poisoning water supplies, instigating looting of government warehouses and blaming it on the people, committing arson and beginning defamation campaigns of the opposition leaders." Some superficial concessions should be made at the same time as these actions continued, such as giving promises of a multi-party system and democracy. Certain student leaders should be ear-marked for assassinations and, eventually, the army would use the "deteriorating conditions in the country" as a pretext to stage a coup. Then, a bloody suppression would follow. An "anti-strike committee" had been formed to implement the scheme, according to the document.
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This document was first published in the first week of September 1988, about 10 days after the meeting, during the demonstration. While the authenticity and details of the document is contestable, as it could be tailored to suit varying situations, a meeting did indeed appear to have taken place on the said date.
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In the last week of August 1988, when information about the alleged signing of a document or a pledge by colonels and above ranks, mostly in Yangon leaked to the public, the antigovernment demonstrators issued statements that colonel and above ranks officers from the Tatmadaw will be discharged once the anti-government movement attains victory. The document, which was supposedly signed by the colonels and above ranks, pledged to maintain institutional unity and solidarity within the Tatmadaw, to safeguard the nation from all forms of destructive elements, to resolve differences of opinion by peaceful means, to help each other to rectify and clear any suspicion, not to seek revenge and vendetta or hold grudge against each other, to look after each other within the legal framework, not to take up arms and attempt assassination under any circumstance, and to protect and look after those leaders and Tatmadaw commanders being regarded as parents. In the same light, US Congressman
Stephen J. Solarz, after a one-day trip to Yangon on 3 September 1988, told the Bangkok Post that military personnel (up to the rank of colonel) were sympathetic to the antigovernment demonstrators. 10 The Tatmadaw leadership of the time, as revealed by Lt. Gen.
Chit Swe, had formed an opinion, established a common position, and unanimously accepted the notion that the Tatmadaw must be united and stand together in time of crisis. 11 This common position was further explained to those in the lower levels of command, first mostly in Yangon and its surrounding areas and then in other parts of the country. When the regional commanders and division commanders were brought into Yangon for consultation in the second week of September, they were also given an explanation of the Tatmadaw's common position and asked to sign the document.
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The anti-government demonstrations became increasingly violent, and subsequently former explaining that such an activity might not only lead to further confusion among the general public, but send a wrong signal to regional neighbours. The next day, the US embassy issued a statement that the sighting of the US fleet in Myanmar territorial waters was just a rumour.
At the same time, there were movements of troops from the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
of China along the Myanmar border. Several PLA brigades were deployed along the border and put on alert. The Tatmadaw authorities in Yangon informed the Chinese military attaché that the situation would be under control in a fairly short period of time. They even sent a delegation to the Myanmar border to meet senior PLA officer and to verify the situation and assure that no foreign power would interfere in Myanmar's internal affairs. There had been some reports that the PLA was quite prepared to take the Shan state, by using the BCP as a front, if the US fleet or troops landed in Myanmar.
Moreover, the military intelligence had received intelligence about major offensives by various insurgent groups. In particular, the BCP in the northeast and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in the southeast were main areas of concern. Reinforcement in those front line areas meant less resources available for restoring and maintaining law and order in the cities. The anarchic situation in cities, especially in Yangon, left the Tatmadaw with no access to essential strategic materials, such as fuel, which greatly hampered the mobility and combat readiness of the armed forces. With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the BCP was preparing to launch a major military offensive in the Northeastern part of Myanmar. The Tatmadaw by then realized that it had to fight the major battles at two fronts. With the chaos in Yangon and other major cities, the Tatmadaw could not fight wars in the border areas; therefore, it appeared to take quick action to restore law and order in the cities.
The events on 12 September 1988 was perhaps the last straw that broke the camel's back.
Another inner circle meeting appeared to take place at U Ne Win's residence; they gathered to discuss drastic actions to break the political deadlock and to restore law and order as early as possible. The discussion revolved around the question of whether to use force to crush the demonstration to restore law and order and to reinstate the BSPP leadership by using the Tatmadaw, or to let the Tatmadaw take over the state. The BSPP leadership was in dilemma.
Dr. Maung Maung recalled:
The [BSPP] government, being defunct, was redundant. We were redundant. Constitutionally, the council of state could proclaim a state of emergency over Yangon, Mandalay, Moulmein and the affected areas and impose military administration, which meant turning over power over those cities to the military. Yet, the disturbances had spread so fast and so far, would that be enough to restore peace and normalcy in the country? 14 Dr. Maung Maung revealed that the major question was whether the Tatmadaw would be willing to continue working for the BSPP. There seemed to be a debate within the inner circle and the majority finally agreed to the second option; let the Tatmadaw do the job of its own will, not for the sake of the party, and to take over the state if the situation further deteriorated.
For some party leaders, it was perhaps a "good ending" of the BSPP rule in Myanmar.
14 ibid, pp. 221-222.
In the meantime, on 8-9 September 1988, the commander-in-chief summoned all regional commanders and division commanders to Yangon and discussed matters relating to the institutional unity of the Tatmadaw and the on-going political crisis, including the possibility of restoring the law and order by force. Whether the date of the coup had been agreed upon was difficult to know. However, since the preparations were already under way, they just needed a few hours to activate the whole plan. Meanwhile, the BSPP issued a statement which allowed the Tatmadaw and armed forces personnel to withdraw their membership from the party on 16 September 1988. The next day, the Tatmadaw issued a public statement requiring its members to fulfill the "original duty" of the perpetuation of the Union, national unity, and the perpetuation of national sovereignty. A demonstrating mob then seized a At about 4:00 pm on 18 September, the Tatmadaw announced its takeover and declared the formation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) on radio. Therefore, the political transition from a single party to a multi-party system ended with a military coup.
THE 1990 GENERAL ELECTION AND THE NATIONAL CONVENTION
Soon after the formation of the SLORC, the Tatmadaw declared there were four immediate tasks to be performed. One of them was to hold a multi-party democracy general election. As promised, a free and fair general election was held on 27 May 1990. March 1989. In his speech, General Saw Maung said, "With the improvement of general situation, free and fair general elections will be held throughout the country with the exception of some areas in which there is no peace and tranquility due to the prevalence of insurgency. After the election, having followed the necessary procedure, the Pyithu Hluttaw representatives elected by the people will form a government in accordance with the law. It is expected that the new government will strive its utmost in leading the State in the interest of the people. We, the Tatmadaw personnel will go back to the barracks [italics are mine]". four days before General Saw Maung's press briefing, Aung San Suu Kyi said, "Whoever is elected will first have to draw up a constitution that will have to be adopted before the transfer of power. They haven't said how the constitution will be adopted. It could be through a referendum, but that could mean months and months, if not years". In fact, the importance and necessity of a constitution for the transfer of power was clearly spelled out in more detail at the 43rd press conference held on 9 June 1989. The SLORC spokesman said:
"It has been said that power will be transferred to the government that will come into being in accordance with the law after the elections are held. Power could not be handed over immediately after the elections are held as government will have to be formed on the basis of a constitution. If power will be transferred hastily [without a proper procedure], it would lead to a shaky and weak government; any rational person can understand it. Only if the power is transferred to a government formed systematically on a basis of a constitution, will the government to be constituted be stable. We have two constitutions at present, namely the 1947 constitution and the 1974 constitution. If the Hluttaw members unanimously selected one of the two constitutions and formed a government then, power would be transferred to them. We are ready to transfer power to the government formed in accordance with the constitution. If both the constitutions are not acceptable, a new one should be written. The Tatmadaw will not draw up a new constitution. The SLORC will not do it either. The representatives elected are to draw it; if the people approve the constitution then power will be transferred to the government which emerged according to that new constitution [author's italics]". constitutional basis of the Hluttaw formation was also lacking.
Although the election law states that "The Pyithu Hluttaw shall be formed with the Hluttaw representatives who have been elected according to this law from the constituencies", it did not provide any legal basis on which the Hluttaw could be formed. Nevertheless, both the SLORC and the political parties, especially the NLD, agreed that a constitution was needed before the transfer of power. This had become an issue only after the election when the NLD began to pay the transfer of power the first priority and the SLORC began the constitution drafting. On 12 April 1990, six weeks before the election, Major General Khin Nyunt said:
"The party that wins in the 27 May elections will have to form a government.
Only if a firm constitution can be drawn up and a government formed in accordance with it will the government be a strong one. Only a strong government can lead the State for a long time. The SLORC at different levels will continue to carry out the responsibilities of the State while the constitution is being drafted. So we will continue to carry out the responsibilities even after the elections. We will continue to do so till a strong government has been formed".
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A few days before the elections, the SLORC more clearly pronounced its position. It became more assertive and said that "those elections will produce only a national assembly to write a new constitution" 33 and "it would not relinquish power until a government is formed and a new constitution is written". 34 Three days after the elections, General Saw Maung reinstated his position that a government is to be formed in accordance with the law and the SLORC will remain in power until such an occasion arrives. With the confidence in its electoral victory, the NLD began to take issue on the transfer of power with the SLORC. It called the government to convene the Pyithu Hluttaw and to transfer power. At about the same time, in defiance of the authority of the SLORC, the NLD planned to hold an assembly of the party leadership and representatives elected. When the government refused to comply with its demands, the NLD prepared to arrange the transfer of power on its own, by drafting an interim constitution and trying to convene a parliament. To warn the possible consequences of such a move, at the 100th press conference on 13 July When it came to know that the NLD planned to hold a meeting of the Hluttaw representatives elected on 28 May despite a clear warning, the SLORC government issued Notification No.
1/90 on 27 July 1990 as a pre-emptive measure. The notification clearly stated that only the SLORC government had legislative, executive and judiciary power. The SLORC warned that it would not accept the drafting of an interim constitution to obtain state power and to form a government, and it would take effective action against such activities. The notification stated that:
…in the interim period before a government is formed in accordance with a new firm constitution drawn up according to the desires and aspirations of the people, the SLORC (Tatmadaw) will defend, safeguard and ensure the three main causes (non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuity of sovereignty), prevalence of law and order, the rule of law, regional peace and tranquility, safe and smooth transportation and communication, easing the food, clothing and shelter problems of the people and bringing about the development of all the national races of Myanmar Naing-Ngan. 'Some political parties told us to transfer power to a civilian government. If we have to transfer power to a civilian government, we will transfer back to the civilian government from which we took over in the coup. We will not transfer power to any party government or party that would destroy our nation. I want to make it clear on this point'. General Saw Maung, on the one hand, wanted to keep his promise that constitution drafting should be left to politicians. On the other hand, the political parties, particularly the NLD and its allies, were not cooperative. Besides, they pursued a confrontational policy towards the SLORC. As a result of the lack of a political structure that could produce a civilian regime acceptable to the Tatmadaw, the SLORC was convinced that it must lead the constitution drafting process and a managed political transition, in which the political role of the Tatmadaw would be constitutionally assured. By mid-1992, the SLORC stood firmly on the idea of leading the political transition. The SLORC decided to guide the drafting of a new constitution for the future state in which the active participation of the Tatmadaw in future national politics would be assured.
In April 1992, the SLORC took a series of measures designed for political transition in Myanmar. On 4 October 1992, the National Convention Convening Commission was formed with 10 military officers and 8 civilians. The commission was assigned the following tasks:
-to convene the National Convention, which is to lay down principles on which the drafting of a 'firm constitution' is to be based;
-to see to it that these principles are in accordance with the following objectives: In 2006, the MNSP New Mon State Party refused to participate in the process; thus there were fewer delegates in the "Other Invited Personnel" group.
A total of 411 detailed basic principles were laid down at the National Convention. They are:
(5) for the State fundamental principle; (11) for the State structure; (18) for the Head of State; (6) for prescribing the self-administered divisions and self-administered zones included in the State structure; (38) for the formation of legislature; (39) for the formation of executive; (19) for the formation of judiciary; (14) for the powers and functions of the President; (13) 
THE POLITICAL EXECUTIVE UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION
When the SLORC began the national convention process, the state-owned media promoted an idea of establishing a presidential government in Myanmar. The serialized article in the newspaper explained the pros and cons of a presidential government and argued in favour of the Indonesian style of governance. When the basic principles were laid down for the future constitution, the strong executive with a separation of power between the executive and the legislature was constituted. The president was projected as the most important person in the executive. Who could become the president? According to the basic principles laid down at the National Convention, the president must be a citizen of Myanmar who has been residing continuously in the country for at least 20 years up to the time of the election. The president himself, parents, spouse, children and their spouses shall not owe allegiance to a foreign power, shall not be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country and shall not be persons entitled to the rights and privileges of a subject or citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, the president must be "well acquainted with affairs of State such as political, administrative, economic and military affairs". 43 It is important to note that the principle did not state that the president must have military experience or military service. Nor was there any mention that the president must be an active member of the Tatmadaw. Thus, technically, a civilian with considerable knowledge in military affairs could become the president.
What is the procedure for the election of the president? The election of the president is closely related to the elections to the legislature; the presidential election is not based on direct popular vote. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the nature of the legislature. In the nomination list of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services based on equal representation from each region and state. Thus, since the Union of Myanmar has 14 regions and states, there will be 12 representatives to be elected from each region or state while the C-in-C list will include 4 representatives from each region or state. In sum, the "National Legislature" has a total of 664 seats, of which 166 will come from the C-in-C nomination list:
they will be known as "Tatmadaw Member Representatives". A total number of 498 seats will be contested: 330 for the lower house and 168 for the upper house. Hluttaw, that is 664 people, will vote one of the three vice-presidential candidates as the President of the Union of Myanmar while the other two will become vice-presidents.
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What is the prospect of a C-in-C nominated vice-president candidate becoming the president?
It depends on the electoral results for both houses of the legislature. will have two vice-presidential candidates and one of them will surely become the president.
In this situation, the vice-presidential candidate nominated by the C-in-C or the Tatmadaw will just become a vice-president. The possibility of a political party or a coalition of parties winning a large majority of seats in the "free and fair" elections is perhaps a reason behind entrusting more authority in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services. , 10 April 1994. 46 In the lower house, 165 seats will be 50% and 248 seats will be 75% of the elected members. In the upper house, 84 seats will be 50% and 126 seats will be 75% of the elected members.
NLM
The Commander-in-Chief is perhaps the single most important person in Myanmar's future.
The C-in-C will nominate 25% of the representation in the national legislature and one third in the regional legislatures. He will also nominate three ministerial portfolios for defence, home affairs and border affairs. Moreover, it is the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services and not the president, who is the supreme commander of all armed forces; this includes the police, paramilitary organizations and even the civil defence forces. Besides, the C-in-C is equivalent to the vice-president. Since "the Tatmadaw has the right to administer for participation of the entire people in the State security and defence and the people's militia strategy shall be formed with Tatmadaw's leadership", in accordance with the forthcoming constitution, the C-in-C is practically the person who could mobilize the entire manpower of the nation for national defence. The National Convention endorsed that the Commander-inChief of the Tatmadaw is equivalent to the post of Vice-President as he not only controls 25% of both houses of the parliament, but also appoints three key portfolios of defence, home affairs and border affairs. In addition, the Tatmadaw will maintain institutional autonomy in decision-making and take command of all the armed forces in the Union, which includes the police and paramilitary organizations. Moreover, the Tatmadaw is entrusted with safeguarding the state constitution and the Union from all internal and external dangers.
How does the C-in-C become more powerful than the president? In one respect, it is the Commander-in-Chief who decides and nominates the vice-presidential candidate who could become the president. Therefore, if the vice-presidential candidate nominated by the C-in-C becomes the president, the former could be very much under the influence, if not control, of the latter. According to the forthcoming constitution, "the president appoints the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services with the proposal and recommendation of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC)"; it does not mean that the president can decide who could become the C-in-C. 47 The 11-member NDSC consists of the president, two vice presidents, two speakers from the lower and upper houses of the parliament, incumbent commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief, and ministers for defence, foreign affairs, home affairs and border affairs. Among 11 members, at least six are from the Tatmadaw: either the president or the vice president (nominated by the C-in-C), commanderin-chief (himself), the deputy commander-in-chief (immediate subordinate of the C-in-C), and the ministers for defence, home affairs and border affairs (nominated by the C-in-C). Therefore, the C-in-C commands the majority in the NDSC and his decision will prevail. It is important to remember that it is the C-in-C who decides and nominate the vice-presidential candidate who could become the president; therefore, even the president could be under the influence of the C-in-C. In this context, although the new C-in-C is theoretically appointed by the president, for all practical purposes, it is the incumbent C-in-C The NLD was also very critical about the Tatmadaw's harsh measures to maintain law and order, and political stability. This tough and rough manner of handling political opposition earned the Tatmadaw the bad reputation of an "oppressor". The NLD leadership had persistently attacked the Tatmadaw on various occasions. At one stage, the Tatmadaw was even accused of being a fascist organization: an insult the Tatmadaw commanders were not prepared to tolerate at all. It had been accused from time to time of being General Ne Win's stooges or protégés. Some accusations were interpreted by the military as intentions to break up the Tatmadaw. 53 Second, there was no political structure that could produce a civilian regime acceptable to the Tatmadaw. In the view of the Tatmadaw, the NLD was not an acceptable political party as it would not accommodate various interests of the Tatmadaw.
Instead of finding a mutual ground, the NLD had been pursuing confrontational policies with the military government at a time when Myanmar was barely out of a single-party 50 Asiaweek, 13 July 1990.
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Asiaweek, 22 June 1990.
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Asiaweek, 13 July 1990. 53 Through its existence, since it faced the Communist's attempt to split the armed forces, the Tatmadaw has developed a complex code of interpretation relating to attempts to split the armed forces. Speeches and comments of politicians and political activitists were interpreted within that framework. In December 1989, the Tatmadaw published a book titled "Attempts to Break-Up the Tatmadaw" for restricted internal circulation.
authoritarian rule, and was looking for a fairly liberalized political environment. 54 The
Tatmadaw was not accustomed to such a situation.
While the prevailing domestic and international opinion about the political transition after the 1990 elections was a broken promise by the SLORC/SPDC, the historical facts reveal that it was not really the case in a strict sense. The political parties appeared to misread and overlook the message the military government had persistently and consistently sent. While the military gave more attention to the "systematic" and "in accordance with law" aspects of power transfer, the NLD gave more weight to "the earliest" aspect. At the outset of the 1990 elections, even some regional commanders prepared systemic transfer of authority to an elected government. However, it appeared that the situation was not conducive for a smooth political transition in Myanmar. The confrontation between the two political forces had led to a political deadlock and an intractable conflict. Finally, the SLORC changed its position on the constitution drafting process from a bystander to a key player.
In the past 17 years, the Tatmadaw has taken a number of measures aimed at effecting a political transition in Myanmar. It has built political, economic and military power bases for itself, and has laid down foundations for its continued dominance in Myanmar's political, social and economic future. Through its managed political transition, the Tatmadaw has constitutionally assured its role in future politics and asserted its influence and corporate interest in the future state. It seeks several prerogatives in the future state structure. However, the legitimacy of its control of the state will not be unchallenged. Whether it can translate its prerogatives into influence in the future will depend largely on the ability of the future Tatmadaw leadership in mobilizing its resources, capacity and legitimacy. Moreover, its decision to remain in power and retain its institutional dominance in Myanmar politics at all cost has tarnished its reputation among the international community and political dissidents within and without. Therefore, the military regime has suffered the political nemesis in the name of a political leader whose fame has traveled across the entire globe.
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Many people will disagree with this assessment. But there was certain level of openness in the press. Although the SLORC imposed strict regulations on press censorship, there were fairly large number of political pamphlets critical of regime policies circulating quite freely in the streets.
After nearly 15 years of national convention process, it is now closer to the drafting of a constitution, which forms the basis of political transition in Myanmar. Whatever people say about the National Convention and the nature of political transition in Myanmar, the SPDC is determined to go ahead with its own plan. Some critics might argue that the political transition is merely a repackaging of the military government into a Commander-in-Chief government; yet, it could provide more political space for civilian participation in national politics since it transformed from a military regime to military-influenced regime. In the future state, at least for the short and medium terms, political and economic power will most likely lie with the Tatmadaw, as it holds key cabinet positions, and power will be distributed and allocated among military commanders at various levels. While it will control the political process, the Tatmadaw will allow institutions, such as constitutionalism, parliament, party politics and elections, to function, giving some space for politicians and civilians to debate on non-military issues. However, it is very likely that politicians will be kept out of the power arrangement. More technocrats could be brought into governance, though, especially in the socio-economic field. Although the president is the head of state as well as government, the most important key person is the Commander-in-Chief. Whether the C-in-C will actually make use of its power and turn the prerogatives to his advantage depends very much on his personal relations with the president. The political transition process in Myanmar, at present, will not be perfect. Meanwhile, before Myanmar could move on to the next stage in the process of political liberalization or democratization, political parties will need to focus on the party and party system institutionalization during the transitional period, so that a multiparty democratic system could be successfully implemented.
